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Many palatable animals, for example hoverflies, deter predators by mimicking well-defended insects such as wasps. However, for human observers, these flies 
often seem to be little better than caricatures of wasps—their 
visual appearance and behaviour are easily distinguishable 
from those which they are attempting to mimic. This 
imperfect mimicry baffles evolutionary biologists, because 
one might expect natural selection to do a more thorough 
job. Here we discuss two types of cognitive processes that 
might explain why distinguishable mimics could enjoy 
increased protection from predation. Speed–accuracy 
tradeoffs in predator decision making might give imperfect 
mimics sufficient time to escape, and predators under time 
constraint might avoid time-consuming discriminations 
between well-defended models and inaccurate edible mimics 
and instead adopt a “safety first” policy of avoiding insects 
with similar appearance. Categorisation of prey types by 
predators could mean that wholly dissimilar mimics may 
be protected, provided they share some common property 
with noxious prey. If predators use experience with multiple 
prey types to learn rules rather than just memorising the 
appearance of individual prey types, it follows that different 
individual predators should form different categories, each 
including separate types of novel prey. Experimental studies 
to test these hypotheses should be straightforward, because 
we can use the relatively simple signals (e.g., striped patterns) 
with which prey manipulate predator behaviour as tools 
for investigating cognitive processes that underlie decision 
making and object recognition in animals’ daily lives.
Introduction
Mimicry—the phenomenon where organisms converge 
in appearance on one another, often to warn or deceive 
predators—provides examples of adaptive evolution so 
striking that they should convince even staunch sceptics of 
the principles of evolution. Perfectly harmless caterpillars 
look like venomous snakes, while angler fish display lures 
that resemble small fish. In many other cases, however, 
the match between the mimic and its model is almost 
disappointingly sloppy. Take many of the familiar hoverflies: 
their yellow and black stripes might resemble a stinging 
wasp to an inexperienced observer—but the body shape, 
flight behaviour, and colour pattern of many species easily 
identify them as defenceless flies (Figure 1). Yet, the strategy 
works! The flies’ colouration pattern provides protection that 
they would not enjoy if they were, say, plain brown [1]. The 
suspicion that such imperfect mimics might not in fact be 
mimics at all was refuted already in 1935, when Mostler [2] 
demonstrated that inexperienced, lab-reared birds of several 
species would not only enthusiastically attack bumblebees, 
honeybees, wasps, and their mimics, but the birds would learn 
to reject these and also avoid relatively crude mimics if they 
were offered after an encounter with a wasp. The syrphids 
thus engage in so called Batesian (deceptive) mimicry, where 
a palatable animal mimics the display of a noxious model. 
Imperfect mimics also occur in vertebrate colour displays, for 
example in some North American snakes [3].
Several evolutionary scenarios have been proposed that 
might explain such imperfect mimicry. One suggestion 
that is relatively difficult to test is that mimics have not had 
sufficient time to converge fully on the model (see [1] for a 
critique). Another possibility is that models and mimics are 
engaged in an evolutionary arms race, where the model is 
under pressure to evolve away from the mimic [4]. This is 
because predators are more likely to attack noxious prey after 
encounters with individuals of similar palatable species ([2], 
but see also [5]). Some researchers have related the degree 
of similarity in mimicry systems to the relative frequencies 
of models and mimics [3,5], while others pointed out that 
there are conflicting demands on animals’ colour patterns, 
resulting in compromises between signalling strategies 
and, for example, constraints of thermoregulation [6]. The 
number of controversial views aired in high-profile journals 
indicates that biologists are clearly intrigued by the problem, 
but good experimental evidence for many scenarios still 
needs to be collected. Our view is that we cannot quantify 
the evolutionary pressures on animal colour patterns without 
considering what is known about predators’ cognitive 
abilities. In some cases, we suggest that the peculiarities 
of predator “receiver psychology” might result in the full 
protection of mimics, even if these only partially resemble 
their models and both are distinguishable by predators—
resulting in a lack of selective pressure to increase the 
similarity between a mimic and its model(s).
A simple psychological explanation for predator responses 
to poor mimics could be that predators innately avoid any 
stripy pattern. Such innate biases do exist [7], but typically 
they are weak and can easily be overwritten by learning 
[1,2,4]. Therefore, current explanations of imperfect mimicry 
refer to predators’ individual experience with unpleasant 
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mimics, and responses to mimics that are guided by such 
experience. Previous explanations of imperfect mimicry 
include the following: (a) the possibility that differences in 
visual systems between humans and insectivores (typically 
avian predators) might mean that what constitutes a poor 
match for human observers might in fact be perfect mimicry 
for some predators [8]; (b) in the presence of multiple 
aposematic models, mimics attempt to find a compromise 
by appearing intermediate to all of them [1,9]; and (c) 
generalisation of predators to distinguishable but similar 
prey might give sufficient protection for poor mimics 
[4,10–12]. These explanations are not mutually exclusive, 
and empirical evidence is scant [1]. However, the predator 
learning processes that have been discussed in the context 
of mimicry are essentially Pavlovian, in that they invoke only 
simple processes of information storage, generalisation, and 
forgetting [13], and thus do not fully capture the range of 
cognitive abilities that predators might use. Cognition can 
be defined as the ability to use internal representations of 
information acquired in separate events, and to combine 
these to generate novel information and apply it in an 
adaptive manner [14] —a classic example is the cognitive 
map, where subjects integrate information from separately 
travelled paths to calculate new routes [15]. In contemporary 
animal behaviour, there is a general fascination with probing 
the level of cognitive complexity that animals can achieve. 
Not applying the fruits of this research to animals’ natural 
lives would be a major oversight—we cannot continue to 
regard animals as simple “conditioned reflex machines” if 
we are to understand the complexity of interactions between 
signallers and receivers, especially where receivers might 
combine experience with multiple signallers to form rules for 
adaptive behaviour. Here we discuss two cognitive abilities 
that allow predators to make effective decisions about 
whether or not to attack, while maintaining a low level of risk 
of confusing a nutritious mimic with its noxious model. These 
processes may be exploited by imperfect mimics. 
Speed–Accuracy Tradeoffs in Animal Decision Making? 
Everyday experience shows that difficult perceptual tasks 
require more time than easy tasks do. If time is limited for 
difficult judgments, one is more likely to make mistakes. 
Consider a hypothetical football match where one team wears 
green and the other turquoise. The two colours are easily 
distinguished, but as players continuously change position 
and mingle with one another, the time for classifying them as 
members of one or the other team will be limited. The result 
is confusion of green and turquoise that will make the match 
substantially less enjoyable. Conversely, when it is essential to 
avoid mistakes, more time is needed. A mushroom collector 
has to make triply sure not to mistake a death cap (Amanita 
phalloides) for the similar and edible false death cap (Amanita 
citrina). If, after extensive inspection, there is any uncertainty, 
a false alarm is obviously preferable to a fatal error. 
Understanding such speed–accuracy tradeoffs is an essential 
part of contemporary decision theory [16].
In bees and mice, just as in humans, sensory discrimination 
typically improves with the time allowed for a decision, and 
difficult discrimination tasks require more time to be solved 
with high accuracy [16–19]. Such speed–accuracy tradeoffs 
result from the need to sample information over time in 
noisy conditions, so that evidence for competing options 
accumulates until a decision threshold is reached [17,20–22]. 
Thus, although the mechanistic causes of speed–accuracy 
tradeoffs might sometimes lie in low-level sensory processes, 
devising strategies that take into account such mechanistic 
limitations requires error awareness and attention, i.e., 
cognitive processes. Such tradeoffs should be of fundamental 
importance to animal decision making in the economy of 
nature, but their relevance in the natural lives of animals 
has only recently been considered [18,23–25]. There are 
obvious implications for predators when similar mimics must 
be discriminated from noxious models, especially in time-
constrained situations, such as scramble competition or when 
the prey might escape. Data on speed-accuracy tradeoffs for 
avian predators are still outstanding, but we suggest possible 
avenues of future research below. 
Testing the Role of Speed–Accuracy Tradeoffs in 
Predators Judging Inaccurate Mimics 
An appropriate test of the interaction between choice time 
and precision of choice needs to involve prey items that are 
only briefly on display, or moving, rather than stationary, and 
with no time limitations. Because there are ethical concerns 
with experimental designs where birds might be stung by 
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0050339.g001
Figure 1. Two Wasp Species and Four Less-Than-Perfect and 
Palatable Mimics
(A) Dolichovespula media; (B) Polistes spec.; (C) Eupeodes spec.; (D) Syrphus 
spec; (E) Helophilus pendulus; (F) Clytus arietes (all species European). 
Note that species C–F do not closely resemble any wasp species. The 
three hoverfly species differ in wing and body shape, antennal length, 
flight behaviour, and striping pattern from European wasps. One fly 
species (E) even has longitudinal stripes, which wasps typically don’t. The 
harmless wasp beetle does not normally display wings, and its legs do 
not resemble those of any wasps. 
(Image Credit:  (A, C, E, and F) by Rob Knell; (B and D) by Tom Ings) 
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insects, live prey cannot be used; instead penalties might 
consist of food rendered unpalatable with bitter quinine 
solution [18]. It will be essential to vary the display time 
or movement speed, as well as the number (and perhaps 
direction of movement) of palatable and unpalatable prey, 
to mimic the crowded conditions that predators might 
encounter in nature. Both sequential and simultaneous 
choice should be tested.
It will first be necessary to quantify the speed–accuracy 
trade-off depending on the similarity between unpalatable 
models and palatable mimics. Emphasis can be placed either 
on accuracy (by varying the severity of punishment for 
errors) or speed (by limiting the time available for an attack). 
Once such baseline data are established, two predictions are 
especially worth testing. One is that if discrimination between 
a model and a mimic costs appreciably more time, even 
relatively inaccurate mimics might gain time to escape [26]. 
Consider your own response to a yellow-and-black hoverfly 
approaching you on a summer day: the first reaction might 
be that you are temporarily alarmed, even though close (but 
time-costly) inspection might identify it as harmless. The 
second prediction is that a predator, under time constraint, 
will avoid time-costly discriminations between defended 
models and inaccurate edible mimics, and instead adopt 
a “safety first” policy of avoiding all insects with similar 
appearance. This could be tested by offering  three types 
of prey that vary in colour and palatability: for example, A: 
red, unpalatable—the aposematic model; B: red-orange—a 
“mimic” similar to A, but palatable; and F: blue, palatable but 
distinct from A. An optimal forager should choose B and F, 
but there is of course the risk of errors (“confusing” A with 
B). Thus, in a situation when time is limited, predators should 
go for safe option F. However, this would involve false alarm 
errors, avoiding the profitable B, and halving the intake rate. 
These experiments should identify the range of similarity in 
which speed–accuracy tradeoffs mean that inaccurate mimics 
might not only enjoy improved protection from predators 
relative to palatable insects without aposematic colouration, 
but also, critically, that a further increase in similarity to the 
model might confer no further fitness benefits. 
Categorisation of Food Types by Animals
Categorisation allows us to classify stimuli in meaningful way 
(e.g., as dogs, cats, chairs, tables, etc.) and independently of 
their individual shape and colour. Note that categorisation 
differs from generalisation. Generalisation allows animals 
to attribute common properties to distinguishable objects; 
however, the level of similarity can vary in a continuous 
fashion, as when one sees a greater similarity of yellow to 
orange than to red, and likewise of yellow to lime than to 
green. On a continuous sensory dimension, such as the visible 
spectrum, the extent of generalisation from a given stimulus 
value (e.g., wavelength of light) typically has a Gaussian 
or exponentially shaped function centred on that value 
[10,27,28]. One might expect the extent of generalisation to 
be related to sensory discrimination thresholds, and hence 
to be related to the speed–accuracy trade-off. By comparison, 
categories have definite boundaries—an object is either a 
member of a category or not—and they can include diverse 
or entirely dissimilar items, such as dogs or fruit. However, a 
category has some defining feature that is common to all its 
members. Categorisation may also be understood as a strategy 
for being economic with memory—by extracting the cues that 
define a class of objects, rather than just a single object, an 
animal might circumvent having to memorise the appearance 
of dozens of salient objects [29].
A predator without categorisation might make almost 
inconceivably inappropriate judgments: consider an animal 
that, after being stung in the tongue by a black-and-red 
bumblebee, treats a black/yellow/white striped bumblebee 
as potentially palatable. Hence, categorisation is adaptive, but 
there is a risk of “false alarm” errors, where palatable mimics 
(even if they bear no direct similarity to aposematic prey) fall 
within an avoided category. Pigeons and chicks have been 
shown to be able to form categories [28,29]; for example, 
Cerella [30] made a good case that pigeons recognise oak 
leaves as a natural category. In particular, after learning a 
single oak leaf shape, they did not discriminate between a 
wide range of oak leaves, but reliably distinguished oaks from 
leaves of other species. As with tree leaves, aposematic insects 
such as wasps, bumblebees, and shield-bugs (Pentatomidae) 
have a characteristic shape that birds might recognise as 
natural kinds; alternatively, they might classify patterns 
according to whether or not they contain more than one 
colour (independently of the particular combinations of 
colours). 
Testing the Role of Prey Categorisation in Insectivores
Rather than just associating one colour pattern with an 
unpleasant experience, do predators learn the rules for 
classifying patterns, such as those that are displayed by toxic 
insects, to predict whether an unfamiliar species of insect is 
safe to eat? In human education, a successful strategy is first 
to learn the rules, then the exceptions. If birds first learn 
the basic principles of warning colouration, then even poor 
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0050339.g002 
Figure 2. Colour Coats of European Bumblebees and a Stingless 
Mimic
(A) Bombus lapidarius; (B) B. terrestris; (C) B. pratorum; and (D) the fly 
Volucella bombylans. Note that (B) and (D) are considered part of the 
same mimicry ring [31], even though they are clearly distinct. But, a 
predator categorising by shape might respond equally to both, as to the 
highly distinct B. lapidarius (A), and the individual of the fly V. bombylans 
(D), which looks like no particular central European bumblebee species, 
but captures the overall essence of a bumblebee-like appearance (body 
shape, hair coat, and some form of stripes). 
(Image credit: (A and B) by Tom Ings; (C) by Mike Edwards; and (D) by 
Rob Knell) 
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mimics might enjoy protection, especially when predators 
have to make rapid judgements (see above). For example, 
after a predator has had unpleasant encounters with two 
distinct bumblebee species, it might categorise by prey shape 
and not colour, and subsequently avoid all bumblebees 
irrespective of colour banding pattern. 
An especially interesting question concerns the way in 
which animals establish categories after learning about a 
number of distinct stimuli that share common properties. It is 
widely thought that groups of similar but discriminable prey 
species form so-called “mimicry rings” [1,4,31] (Figure 2). 
Often, the participant species engage in Müllerian (“honest”) 
mimicry, where multiple, defended species converge on 
one another in appearance, so that individuals of one 
species can profit from what a predator has experienced 
in an encounter with a member of a different species [4]. 
There is experimental evidence that birds can establish well-
defined colour categories from multiple examples [27]. In 
nature, after being exposed to two or more different prey 
(e.g., wasp) species that differ in shape and colour but share 
a high-contrast stripe pattern, birds might categorise by 
pattern and irrespective of shape, therefore including some 
imperfect mimics (e.g., hoverflies) despite their difference 
in body shape. These questions should be straightforward 
to address experimentally by using sequential exposure to 
different prey. Understanding how avian predators classify 
the range of patterns that are displayed by hymenopterans 
and their mimics, depending on individual experience, and 
the cues that they extract to form categories will give valuable 
insights into the evolution of mimicry and also provide a 
naturalistic context in which to address wider questions about 
the cognitive processes that underlie object recognition in 
nonhuman species [32]. The differences between responses 
following training to single and multiple examples will give 
important information about the natural history of mimicry 
rings and the underlying cognitive processes. An important 
(and untested) prediction is that if predators use experience 
with multiple prey types to learn rules rather than just 
memorising the appearance of individual prey types, it follows 
that different individual predators should form different 
categories, each including separate types of novel prey—
depending on individual experience. 
Conclusion
Mimicry is one of the most venerable and at the same time 
most dynamic areas in whole-organism biology. Recent 
developments in animal cognition now make it possible to 
understand not only how animals perceive mimicry systems 
[8,33,34], but also how they store information about such 
systems, how such information consolidates and changes with 
experience and with time [35–37], and how animals might 
extract the general rules by which animal colouration and 
palatability are linked. Incorporating realistic time constraints 
into experiment designs, and the visual information-
processing speed of predators, should help identify the 
conditions under which the cognitive processes of predators 
will sometimes generate space for inaccurate mimics to live. ◼
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